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FCI/IC 74-094

13 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence**SUBJECT : Perspectives for Intelligence
1975 - 1980**

As now constructed, Parts I and III of this paper lack lead-off, topic paragraphs summarizing and bringing into focus the main arguments. Part II has such a paragraph, but it cannot by itself adequately bridge the gap between the other two parts. The opening paragraphs of the three parts, if lifted from the rest of the paper, should present a précis for the total argument. The following lead paragraphs are therefore proposed (the Part II paragraph has minor modifications from the original):

Part I - Major World Problems

1. The balance of power between the US and USSR will continue relatively unchanged. The power of both relative to that of many other nations, however, will continue to decline. They will thus be progressively less capable than in the past of influencing international developments. Any nation possessing nuclear weapons or significant control over critical economic resources will be capable of seriously upsetting the international equilibrium. The number of such nations will grow, as will their power. This growth and the shrinking gap between the world's supply of and demand for natural resources will place unprecedented strains on the world's political, economic, and social institutions. To keep the resulting turbulence under control will require an unprecedented degree of interdependence among the world's powers. The steady-state Soviet threat to US national interests will thus be compounded by the multiplication of lesser threats, which in combination and interrelationship with the Soviet threat will present progressively more complex policy problems to the US Government.

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Part II - The Role of Intelligence

1. The primary charge on intelligence during these years will be to provide accurate and pertinent information and assessments with respect to an increasing range of complicated problems facing the US. These must be presented to the decision makers in forms and styles that will automatically interrelate, and thus reduce, the complexities and will meet increasingly severe standards for timeliness. In particular, the need will be for early warning, because of the acceleration of events, to permit the resolution through diplomacy, negotiation, or other benign initiatives of matters which might otherwise involve political, economic or military contest or unrest. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information will also require a major effort by intelligence to process raw information into manageable form and to devise adequate techniques to identify for consumers the essential elements of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments, and the likely impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will be increasingly expected to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign powers, in addition to exact facts and the basic capabilities available to them.

Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning

1. With little prospect of increased resources, the need to cover a more complex range of intelligence requirements and to process a growing volume of data with greater sophistication and timeliness will place a high premium on imaginative planning. It will require great discretion and careful timing in the development of new collection systems to cope with technological changes in target entities. While the Community must keep abreast of such changes, it cannot afford high cost systems which after years of development prove to be premature, redundant, or obsolete. Because of the greatly increased data flow expected from collection systems already under development, greater emphasis will have to be applied to the development of more sophisticated processing systems and dissemination techniques. A third major planning area will be in the refinement of our requirements and evaluation systems to ensure the application of available resources to our priority needs and the

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most effective distribution of intelligence tasks among components of the Community. The Community will need, finally, more varied and a different mix of manpower to meet both the substantive and technological problems which will be confronting the Community in future years.



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for Daniel O. Graham
Lieutenant General, USA
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